Abstract

This paper responds to the linchpin and central problem of jurisprudence in all its variants (legal schools) which is the task of establishing the meaning, nature and validity of law. The notion of validity and obligation is not only crucial to the concept of law, but also essentially inalienable. In the naturalist perception of law as well as in the positivist explication of law, the notion of validity is given fundamental attention. However, the point of disagreement or conflict, between legal naturalism and legal positivism (which are the two most outstanding and contending legal thoughts) revolves around the question: Where exactly does or from where does the law acquire its obligatory or binding or legal force? Differently put, in what does the validity of the law subsists? What invests a legal stamp or seal on a piece of legislation? Or what confers legality on legal norms that justifies and commands their obedience? While the naturalist appeal to some extra-legal, moral and metaphysical elements as the foundation of the binding force and validity of law (the oughts), the legal positivist took a formal and empirical approach to the explanation of the obligation and validity of law (law as it is, without recourse to metaphysical or moral oughts, is valid and commands unconditional obedience). Consequently, as an attempt towards establishing the ontological nature and justification of law, this paper defends the naturalist jurisprudence. The paper argues that to properly configure the true nature of positive laws otherwise called the jurisprudential laws in relation to law per se, the philosopher transcend the formalistic and materialistic study of law (empirical and descriptive) to the transcendental (prescriptive) examination of law not just in its ontological descriptive dimension, but most essentially in relation to its normative or prescriptive form. In lieu, the paper further argue that consequent upon the prescriptive nature of the law of nature, and the concomitant rational nature of man, positive laws cannot but inexorably be morally biased. The methods adopted by the research include the expository analytic and prescriptive methods.

Highlights

  • In responds to the central problem of jurisprudence which is the task of establishing the meaning, nature and validity of law, this paper critically ruminates on the concept, meaning and nature of law, as a means of attempting a general conceptual and ontological configuration of law

  • I further argue that consequent upon the prescriptive nature of the law of nature, and the concomitant rational nature of man, positive laws cannot but inexorably be morally biased

  • In the making, interpretation and adjudication of law, man’s moral idiosyncrasies must unavoidably come to bear. This is responsible for the controversial nature of law because of the element of relativism that is associated to the conceptualization of morality

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

In responds to the central problem of jurisprudence which is the task of establishing the meaning, nature and validity of law, this paper critically ruminates on the concept, meaning and nature of law, as a means of attempting a general conceptual and ontological configuration of law. This implies that religious orientation, ideology, current, interest and other elements of a scholar’s background necessarily interfere and colour his/her definition of the concept of law This instigated Hans Kelson, the famous Pure Theory exponent to argue that the positive law has been saturated by extra-legal principles The basic difference lies with the fact that, while the former is a materialistic and empirical account of the origin of jurisprudential laws otherwise called derivative laws, the latter essentially points to the abode of generic law, which ought to be the basis of man-made laws In other words, the latter is principally concerned with the paths that lead to law. According to Salmond, an English Jurist’s classification, the sources of law include the following, formal sources and material sources

FORMAL SOURCES OF LAW
ON THE ETYMOLOGICAL MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF LAW
TOWARDS A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LAW
THE NOTION OF OBLIGATION AND SCHOOLS OF JURISPRUDENCE
CONCLUSION
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