Abstract

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a “one-third law” of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which states that strategy A fixates in a B-population with selective advantage if the fitness of A is greater than that of B when A has a frequency 1 3 . This relationship holds for all evolutionary processes examined so far, from the Moran process to games on graphs. However, the origin of the “number” 1 3 is not understood. In this paper we provide an intuitive explanation by studying the underlying stochastic processes. We find that in one invasion attempt, an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which yields the one-third law. We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive.

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