The Сoncept of Sachverhalt: The State of Affairs in the Austrian Philosophy of the 19th Century

Abstract

This article considers the concept of Sachverhalt in the Austrian philosophical tradition of the 19 th century. In particular, we examine the works of Bernard Bolzano, Rudolf Lotze, Julius Bergmann, Franz Brentano, Karl Stumpf, Anton Marty and Alexius Meinong. The emergence of the concept of Sachverhalt, or the state of things, in extensive philosophical discussions is connected with the works of L. Wittgenstein and phenomenologist Adolf Reinach. Reinach criticized previous theories of judgment. He wrote that they were built on the evaluation, affirmation or negation of a particular object. And that is a mistake. Only introduction of the concept of Sachverhalt allows us to solve a number of logical contradictions that faces the theory of judgment. We find this term in the works of Lotze and Stumpf, but what is its position in their theories? Does it solve the problems that mentions Reinach? Therefore, in this study, we answer the question of how fair is Reinach’s criticism. Also we analyze the various theories of judgment in Austrian philosophy to determine whether it is possible to speak of Sachverhalt as a single entity connecting the concepts of all authors in the Austrian tradition.