THE OMBUDSMAN IN BRITAIN: A QUALIFIED SUCCESS IN GOVERNMENT REFORM

Abstract

The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has not been the dismal failure forecast by critics at the time the office was established in 1967. One alleged defect — not criticizing the substance of administrators’ discretionary decisions — is characteristic to a large degree of other admired ombudsmen. Recruiting the Commissioner and his investigators from the civil service has not had expected harmful effects. On the other hand, the office has fallen short of the performance of other ombudsmen with regard to the public's access to the Commissioner (the MP filter), the efficiency of his investigative methods, and certain limitations on his jurisdiction. Failure so far to remove these defects appears to be the result of inadequate comparative research and analysis in support of reformers’ proposals, the overly cautious and consensual style of civil service policy formulation, and opposition from members of existing institutions (MPS and the officers of civil service unions) who mistakenly believe that their complaint handling activities are threatened by proposed changes.