The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-45

Abstract

As a general rule, treaties of alliance, as between all forms of political organization, continue for only so long as they remain compatible with the perceived interests of the participants. The six-hundred-years-old alliance1 between Britain and Portugal has proved to be no exception. In the more recent past British policy makers the Foreign Office, the Cabinet and the Service Departments have been particularly keen to scrutinize and reassess the Portuguese connection in terms of the United Kingdom's own perceived strategic and commercial interests. The alliance had endured, even in the twentieth century, precisely because it has continued to serve those interests, in return for which successive British Governments have upheld their promise to guarantee, albeit reservedly, the integrity of Portugal and her empire. At the same time it would be incorrect to assume that discussion amongst British policy makers on the subject of the alliance has produced complete agreement. An examination of the official discussion within the period 1910-45 reveals a number of divergent views concerning the Portuguese connection. Even the possibility of terminating the alliance was discussed on occasions and sometimes received the approbation of members of the policy making bodies. Within the period under review the first occasion upon which a full discussion occurred on the subject of the alliance was in late 1912. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Prince Louis Battenburg, First Sea Lord, were both convinced that Spain was more important from the military and strategic point of view than Portugal; and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was hardly compatible with good relations with Spain given the animosity that existed between the two Iberian countries.2 As a result, the Admiralty War Staff, largely influenced by Churchill, drew up a memorandum which was critical to