The objective stance and the boundary problem

Carla Bagnoli

doi:10.1111/ejop.12678

Abstract

AbstractThis paper investigates some unexplored ambivalences of Strawson's distinction between the participant stance marked by reactive attitudes and the objective stance in which such attitudes are deemed inappropriate. First, a distinction between recipient‐oriented and agent‐oriented reasons for taking the objective stance is introduced. These are both practical reasons rooted in the agent's position. The former category of reasons refers to the recipient's capacities for moral agency, and the latter to the agent's interests and concerns. Second, it is shown that taking the objective stance for recipient‐oriented reasons (a) is a moral move, which alters one's normative relation to others; and (b) it may have severe disempowering effects on others. Third, departing from current debates, this investigation refocuses on cases in which the objective stance is grounded on self‐defensive or adversarial reasons. The examination of such cases shows that the objective/participant divide stands behind and organizes the complex dynamics through which moral membership is negotiated. Once agent‐oriented reasons are brought into focus, it appears that the divide is contestable and renegotiable: the boundaries of the relevant community can be alteredbyclaiming and reclaiming responsibility. Correspondingly, reactive attitudes should be acknowledged as means and drives of the struggle for moral and political recognition.

Highlights

This paper explores our responses to accidents with an eye towards what they can tell us about the nature of moral responsibility
Of particular interest is what such responses suggest about the possibility that culpability is not a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility
The paper defends the thesis that the sort of moral responsibility capable of being

Summary

Introduction

Offering a satisfactory accounting of the blame warranting sense of responsibility is impossible if we ignore its relationship to the obligation bearing sense, especially if we’re interested in cases involving accidents or other brands of moral luck where philosophers have often been compelled to defend claims about the responsibility of agents that seem paradoxical. One wants to make sense of blameworthiness and the sort of moral responsibility associated with it – in other words, whether one understands blame warranting responsibility in terms of accountability, answerability, attributability, or some combination of the three 13 – in each of these cases

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Results

Conclusion