Abstract
Abstract The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. The school’s adherents also argued from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper, I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyaya argument may be defensible.
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