Abstract

The subject of this book is the US atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework of an entirely new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. Because of the atomic bomb, for the first time in history a nation’s scientific resources became a key consideration in assessing a potential national security threat. In September 1949, US intelligence was shocked to discover that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. Coming just four years after the United States had become the world’s first nuclear power, the Soviet atomic bomb was produced in half the time American intelligence had predicted. Compounding the confusion was the fact that American intelligence had engaged in an effort against Nazi Germany that had correctly assessed the status of the German atomic bomb program. This book explores the following: Considering how successfully the US conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the US Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities?

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