The NPA’s Limited Independence and How to Mitigate Political Interference in High-Profile Cases

Abstract

In South Africa, the efficacy of the criminal justice system rests on the ability of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to conduct prosecutions fairly and effectively. This is because it enjoys a monopoly over the prosecution of crime, as it decides which cases will proceed to court. While there is some room for private prosecutions, these are few and far between and do not make a dent in the power of the state to prosecute crime. Political pressure can interfere with effective prosecution. Particularly where an alleged perpetrator is a political figure, there is an incentive to try to influence the head of the prosecuting authority. My suggestion is to establish a special prosecuting office, separate from the normal prosecuting authority, to deal with cases involving members of the executive and the legislature. The purpose is to create a greater measure of independence, although comparative examples demonstrate that such an office too can suffer political interference. Removing political cases from the NPA would also enable the head of the NPA to concentrate on increasing the effectiveness of the prosecuting authority and public confidence in its abilities, without derailing its focus by having to fight for institutional independence.