The Notion of Truth in Sciences and Medicine, Why it Matters and Why We Must Defend It

Abstract

Philosophers have described several approaches for scientific research, including causal inference and induction, the hypothetico-deductive method, inference of the best explanation, Bayesianism or causal network analysis. Prescriptive truth is dependent upon the values that one brings into scientific inquiry. One may oppose the writings of Bertrand Russell and Helen Longino. The former argues that values may negatively impact inquiry, while Longino argues that value-free research does not exist, and we must cope with it. However, Longino proposes a very stringent value-system which does not allow certain research to be conducted. The problem arises when prescriptive truth becomes hypertrophic, self-righteous, rigid, and unconnected to reality, which is the transformation into ideology. Ideological intrusion into science and medicine, such as with Social Justice Ideology (SJI), is indeed a problem in Western democracies. It derived from scholarship originating in the humanities (law, social sciences, branches of philosophy, etc.) and then transferred to Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics and Medicine (STEMM). The STEMM field was thought to be immune to SJI because of its rigorous methodology, but the hyper-specialization and absence of training in the humanities made it vulnerable to SJI. These intrusions into STEMM and the amplification in the last 2–3 years are potentially due to ‘concept creep,’ psychogenic contamination, herd behaviour and, for activists, strategical equivocation (motte-and-bailey fallacy).By denying truth and reality, science is reduced to a pointless, if entertaining game; a meaningless, if exacting exercise; and a destinationless, if enjoyable journey. (Theocharis and Psimopoulos 1987)Now the characteristic doctrine of modern irrationalists, as we have seen, are: emphasis on will as opposed to thought and feeling; glorification of power, belief in intuition ‘positing’ of propositions as opposed to observational and inductive testing. (Russell 1936)