Abstract

This paper deals with the notion of desire in L?vinas? philosophy, with special attention to the question of its metaphysical character. By relying upon the early works of L?vinas as well, the author deconstructs the notion of desire by pointing at its contradictory relationship to the concept of needs. Attention is devoted to certain phenomenological interpretations (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Michel Henry) and to the dialectical understanding of desire (Hegel) that enables us to seize the specificity of L?vinas? viewpoint. At the end of the paper the author discusses the possibility of an ethics of responsive desire within the phenomenology of alterity.

Highlights

  • U Levinasovoj filozofiji želja nipošto nije puka marginalna tema o kojoj bi se govorilo da bi spisak tematizovanih predmeta bio potpuno zaokružen

  • Za razliku od zatvorenosti potrebe, predstavlja ukidanje biološke imanencije koja nije ništa drugo do neprestano, automatsko ponavljanje istosti

  • Užitak je samo odgođen u radu: hegelovska želja bi, dakle, bila samo potreba u Levinasovom smislu.... kretanje želje može da bude to što jeste samo kao paradoks, kao odricanje od željenog” (Derida 2001: 27) Istvoremeno se radi o askezi i o nemogućnosti askeze: prema drugosti Drugog ne smemo da se odnosimo kao subjekti moći, ali je drugost Drugog ujedno i odvojena od našeg horizonta, ona ga beskonačno nadmašuje – ono željeno uvek izmiče želji ad infinitum

Read more

Summary

Introduction

U Levinasovoj filozofiji želja nipošto nije puka marginalna tema o kojoj bi se govorilo da bi spisak tematizovanih predmeta bio potpuno zaokružen. Željenje je želja koja se javlja u biću koje je već srećno: želja je nesreća srećnog, jedna raskošna potreba.” (Levinas 2006: 47, Lévinas 1971: 57).[2] Želja je dakle ekonomija ireduktibilnog viška, horizont luksuza, ali ona ipak pretpostavlja ekonomiju potrebe kao neprestano upotpunjavanje manjka.

Results
Conclusion

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.