Abstract
Abstract The author proves that rejecting the existence of permissive norms and limitation of norms to prohibitions and commands alone is possible only with reducing the idea of a function. The essence of the function is then the ability of the expression to generate independently the universal norm formation. Such manipulation is easy on the level of logical analysis, but proves risky from other points of view. If we want the deontic logic, which we construct, to consider the fact that permission is pragmatically necessary for the law-maker to convey his normative preferences, we must solve the consequences of the adopted structure of the function of norms, which originate on the socio-linguistic level. It appears, however, that due to a lack of a pragmatic theory useful for lawyers, there is no proof that the pragmatically strong permission can be expressed by means of a lot of prohibitions and commands (dos and don’ts). Besides, reducing permissions only to the language of legal rules is an obligation to accept the structure of an act of communication, which can find its full motivation in the Husserl’s structure of the direct cognition.
Highlights
In the current theory of law practically only the contention regarding a logical status of rights has managed to reveal the whole complexity of this notion
It shall be remembered, as in essence a discourse on the topic of the logical status of rights related to deontic propositions stating that something is permitted
What is conspicuous here are some gaps within the pragmatics of such logic systems
Summary
In the current theory of law practically only the contention regarding a logical status of rights has managed to reveal the whole complexity of this notion. The last of the mentioned theses provides us with two possibilities of resolving the question of entitlements or rights: a) delete the entitlements from any interests of lawyers, b) recognize that these are expressions, in which there is a different function (e.g. performative function) built upon the function of behavior control, and only the analysis of the whole multi-layer act of communication could allow for distinguishing speech acts known as entitlements or rights As it seems, to the authors of an article titled: On the disagreements regarding the so called ‘permissive norms’ [7, pp. Because it is technically impossible, the legislator applies a facilitation providing an owner with a right or an entitlement to use a possession It is possible only at the level of the legal regulation; if we would like to formulate a norm based on these regulations, it could be only an injunction or a prohibition, because only they unambiguously determine our way of acting, and so they fulfill the function of behavior control, which is practically a norm. It should be remembered that as we have shown, a reconstructionist may demand to recognize normative characteristics of permissions, for instance referring to the assumed concept of the legal system
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