The Normative Force behind Marx's Theory of Alienation

Abstract

Over the past few decades, many of Marx's theories have been adapted in the normative direction of rights and social-justice claims. G.A. Cohen, Allen Wood and Steven Lukes are but a few of the thinkers who have made this theoretical move. Ironically, this is not what Marx would have wanted, and he made this explicitly clear throughout his life. Like Hegel and other German thinkers, Marxism, and Marx's work, does try to be systematic and totalising. One stone left unturned by Marx, though, is that of ethics. While he rejected rights and justice claims, this does not leave other outlets of normativity undeserving of consideration. While I do not intend to develop an entire ethical structure from Marx, I do think developing some normative force behind his theory of alienation is possible and even necessary. By bringing in some insights of Aristotle, I hope to develop the normative foundations of Marx's theory of alienation, in contradistinction to a rights- and justice-based approach. I also hope that some recent empirical research will lend some credence to this approach. The blending of Aristotle and Marx has recently been taken up by Martha Nussbaum too, but she draws a few erroneous conclusions that I will highlight. Moreover, Marx draws more radical conclusions than she is willing to bear. Thus, I hope by highlighting alienation that this normative approach will fork alongside the capabilities approach of Nussbaum, and will not follow in her shadow.