Abstract

According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled.

Highlights

  • The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is arguably the most influential argument in favour of scientific realism

  • Howson’s argument decisively destroys the individual theory-based NMA, which has been endorsed by some adherents to NMA and clearly was not understood to be logically flawed by many others

  • This is an important step towards a clearer understanding of the NMA and the scientific realism debate as a whole

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is arguably the most influential argument in favour of scientific realism. In direct response to Psillos (2009) he pointed out that (i) a Bayesian perspective can in principle be based on an objective concept of prior probabilities, which is not anti-realist on any account, and (ii) rejecting prior probabilities amounts to rejecting any probabilistic understanding of a commitment to scientific realism. 5, we argue that, while there is a strand in scientific realism that reduces the NMA to the individual theory-based NMA, Putnam and Boyd, the first main exponents of the argument, clearly endorsed the frequency-based NMA. 6, it is explained why the use of subjective priors poses no problem for the frequency based NMA as a realist argument.

Howson’s argument
Two versions of the NMA
Formalising the frequency-based NMA
Do realists use frequency-based NMA?
Subjective priors and scientific realism
Does NMA need a high frequency of predictive success?
An analogy
Conclusions
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call