The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defence Policy, 1969–1971

Abstract

In July 1969, just six months into his presidency, Richard Nixon made an extensive world tour. While on a stopover in the US Pacific territory of Guam, he gave an off-the-cuff address to assembled journalists in which he outlined his vision for the future of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In light of the quagmire of Vietnam the United States would no longer commit ground troops to wars on the Asian mainland.1 Instead, Nixon looked to America’s Asian allies to enhance their own military power. The United States would continue to provide air and naval support, as well as the all-important extended nuclear deterrent. However, US troops would no longer fight battles on behalf of Asians. This ‘Guam Doctrine’ (later renamed the Nixon Doctrine) was an early example of Nixon’s push to limit America’s commitments and conserve its strength. The policy rethink and the realignment of forces would have a deep impact upon Japan, America’s main ally in the region. US officials repeatedly assured their Japanese counterparts both publicly and privately that the policy was a way of ensuring that America retained a stake in Asia by heading off domestic isolationist sentiment. In spite of such assurances the departure, coupled with the Nixon administration’s goal of withdrawing from Vietnam, caused considerable unease among Japanese elites concerned that they were being abandoned to their fate by their ally.