The “New Triad” of the Bush Administration

Abstract

INTRODUCTIONThe administration of George W. Bush has brought about significant changes in the strategy of the United States. Traditionally, the US calculus of deterrence was based on a of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. This concept was expanded and modified in the Bush administration's classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, completed on January 2002.(1) This document outlined a triad strategic concept, based on and non-nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, and a revitalized defence infrastructure.Following from the recommendations of that report, the US has placed a renewed emphasis on and non-nuclear targeting of armed with nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons. The development of smaller yield and more accurate weapons for hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), alongside a significant ground- and sea-based ballistic missile defence capability, has also become a priority. While missile defence has typically been treated as an issue distinct from US strategy, the increasing incorporation of active defence systems in US policy indicates that such a casual distinction is becoming less appropriate or analytically useful.The new is the key strategic concept that guides the current administration's strategy. It is also, however, a concept that is heavily indebted to the policies of previous administrations. Many of its components were actually developed in the 1990s, as part of the growing post-Cold War American emphasis on rogue states and counterproliferation. Rather than a fundamentally new or revolutionary concept, the new should in fact be seen as the most recent and explicitly manifestation of US counterproliferation efforts.With its strong emphasis on offensive and defence capabilities, the new is meant to achieve over rogue states armed with NBC weapons. This form of nuclear will have a definite impact on the deterrent capabilities of countries like Russia and China. This does not mean that an incipient arms race will take place. Nor does it mean the emergence of a Cold War era relationship with either country. But it does mean that changes in US strategy will be an important factor in their calculations of what is necessary for deterrence. In the short-term, a greater emphasis on secure and survivable second-strike capabilities should be expected. While this in itself will not automatically lead to strategic instability, the Bush administration's current emphasis on grand strategic primacy does provide a very uncertain and potentially unstable context for a renewed US interest in escalation dominance. This grand strategy may make US relations with both countries more adversarial. It may also create a situation where the new becomes that much more threatening.THE NEW TRIAD STRATEGIC CONCEPTThe new is meant to be the new strategic concept for the uncertain post-Cold War security environment. A new mix of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities is seen to be required for the unexpected and diverse threats facing the United States. The NPR outlines a new composed of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defences (active and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure. These components are to be bound together by a sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence (C[Symbol Not Transcribed]I) system.Offensive strike systemsOffensive strike systems are a key component of the new triad. In a post-Cold War era defined by American conventional dominance and potential asymmetrical threats, offensive strike systems are meant to provide a greater degree of flexibility in the design and conduct of military operations in the 21st century battlespace. …