Abstract
AbstractThe new Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance (SURE) program, established by the 2008 Farm Bill, mandates disaster payments for individual farms that experience crop losses in excess of 50% of their average production, whether or not those farms are located in regions affected by catastrophic events. This study shows that, because of this provision, the SURE program creates substantial incentives for moral hazard behaviors in many market‐related situations. These incentives are especially severe when market prices equal or fall below prices at which farmers value commodity losses for federal crop insurance purposes.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
