The new public autonomy?: Public–private partnerships in a multi-level, multi-accountable, political environment: The case of British Columbia, Canada

Abstract

The Canadian province of British Columbia has been widely recognized as the North American leader in employing Design, Build, Finance Operate public–private partnerships to create new public infrastructure. Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in the world. Provinces exercise considerable autonomy and have powerful revenue raising power at their disposal. Although Canadian local governments are generally seen as substantially inferior to the two senior levels of government, those in British Columbia have in fact managed to achieve quite a bit of autonomy due to non-constitutional factors. Large infrastructure projects, for which municipalities and other local government agencies must look to the province for financial support are among the most controversial of issues within the provincial–local government relationship. The introduction of public–private partnerships represents a classic example of a political entrepreneur changing the rules of the game to favour their desired outcomes. In this case, a government leader determined to pursue an infrastructure program that the province lacked the capital to support and the re-structuring of the state along New Public Management lines. However, even though the rule change favoured the Premier's immediate goals, and allowed him to over-ride much local objection, it can be argued that in the long run neither local governments nor the province have necessarily gained in power by changing the rules of the game. In keeping with the general tenants of the New Public Management, the introduction of public–private partnerships has given precedence to technocratic forms of knowledge, especially those involved with finance and accounting, with the aim of pursuing public goals in the most “economically efficient” manner possible. The flip side is that democratic input is strictly limited to the initial question as to whether or not a project is desirable, not how it can be best achieved or whether, once underway, it still represents a wise move. As a result, if there are any real winners in terms of autonomy, it has been senior public managers at both the provincial and local level and their financial and accounting advisors. These actors have had the range of issues for which they are accountable markedly simplified when it comes to major infrastructure projects, even as the complexity of such projects are increased by the use of public–private partnerships. Evidence is drawn from government documents, news accounts and interviews conducted by the author with senior managers, politicians and appointed board members of local government organizations (a quasi-governmental agency and a regional municipality's transit authority) as well as a provincial ministry, which acts as a control case. By employing three cases within the same province and the same time-frame, many of the contextual factors that can confound a study of this sort have been held constant for the purpose of comparison.