The Negotiations Begin, October–December 1957

Abstract

After five months of delay, the British government hoped that the OEEC ministerial meeting of 16 October 1957 would mark the beginning of serious negotiations on the FTA. There was no misconception about the formidable obstacles that lay ahead; the Cabinet was aware of the ‘the real technical difficulties and the many serious political drawbacks for the various countries involved’.1 Nevertheless, it was hoped that these problems could be surpassed if enough political will could be generated in favour of the FTA on the Continent. The following analysis of the first three months of the Maudling Committee negotiations, the name given to the OEEC’s Intergovernmental Committee on the FTA, reveals the precarious nature of this strategy. The Macmillan government was right to believe that European political interest in Britain’s proposals existed; where it miscalculated was in how effective this would be in solving the negotiating problems and influencing the French to soften their position on the FTA. This miscalculation also extended to the government’s overestimation of its power in Europe. Hence, it wrongly believed that it could use Commonwealth initiatives to increase Britain’s influence in the FTA negotiations. Furthermore, when Britain’s international status was asserted in the form of strengthened Anglo-American relations after the launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik, the Macmillan government failed to see that this did not necessarily bring dividends in Anglo-European relations.