Abstract

This article examines the role of naval theaters in Soviet grand strategy during the interwar period, as described in various strategic assessments from that period. In contrast to the situation during the Cold War, Soviet naval efforts were then mainly concentrated on the Baltic, where the protection of Leningrad and the Red Army's need for support seemed to require a comparatively strong fleet. The Northern Theater, although important, was too remote to become a decisive area of operations. In the Black Sea and Caspian Theaters, the position of the likely enemies was deemed insecure, therefore the Soviets could easily gain local supremacy and then stay on the defensive. In the Pacific, the threat from Japanese aggression was grave, but Anglo‐American influence for a long time appeared to be a balancing factor. There was a certain conjecture between the views expressed in strategic assessments during the period and the shifts between various schools in Soviet naval thinking: the ‘Old School’ of the 1920s, the ‘Young School’ of the late 1920s‐early 1930s and the ‘Soviet School’ of the late 1930s.

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