Abstract

Abstract Non-reductive physicalism has become the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Some of its metaphysical underpinnings, however, have not been studied in detail yet. The present paper suggests that non-reductive physicalism is committed to a particular view on the connection between the natures of types and the natures of their tokens – thereby defending non-reductive physicalism against an argument recently put forward by Susan Schneider.

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