The Nature of the Rome Statute and the Place of International Law before the International Criminal Court

Abstract

Abstract Over 20 years have passed since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Yet the nature of the Statute still is an open question. It remains unclear who is bound by the Statute, to what extent and under what legal basis. While there is now little doubt that the Statute applies to states parties and the individuals subject to their territorial and active nationality jurisdiction, the same cannot be said for situations accepted by states on an ad hoc basis or referred by the Security Council. This question has significant implications for the Court’s applicable law in particular cases, including on issues of immunities of state officials and non-retroactivity. The aim of this article is to provide a more comprehensive answer to that question by building on previous studies in three ways. First, the nature of the Statute will be sought not only in relation to individuals but also states. Secondly, recourse will be had to the full range of interpretative tools in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, including its travaux préparatoires. Thirdly, particular attention will be given to the principle of systemic integration and the doctrine of delegated powers in international law, as part of the context of the Statute.