The Nature of Persons

Abstract

We now come to the problem of what Reid’s view of the nature of the person is. The problem is presented in section I and arises from Reid’s apparent acceptance of the view that persons both have minds and have bodily characteristics, coupled with his statement that a person is indivisible. In section II it is argued that a whole man, or whole woman, view of the person in Reid is not ruled out by his insistence on indivisibility of the person. In section III it is pointed out that it may be Reid’s position that the possibility of a totally disembodied existence for persons cannot be ruled out, since some varieties of disembodied personal existence are conceivable. In section IV it is conceded that Reid sometimes openly declares, in Inquiry VI for example, that the mind is an unextended and indivisible substance. But it is contended that this declaration only plays a marginally important role in the discussions in which it occurs. And in section V it is contended that this declared position makes for grave difficulties in accommodating some central views of Reid’s on thought and on action alongside a totally disembodied mental or personal existence.