The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics by Jason T. Eberl

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics by Jason T. Eberl Bryan Pilkington EBERL, Jason T. The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. xvi + 384 pp. Cloth, $75.00; eBook, $59.99 Jason Eberl’s new book, The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics, is a much-needed contribution to the ever-growing compendium of bioethics texts. Many such texts either fail to root bioethical considerations in foundations rich enough to support the normative implications of their claims or satisfy the need for a foundation by failing to attend to the substantive and practical ethical issues of health and healthcare. Eberl’s text avoids both pitfalls. It offers a detailed treatment of the metaphysics of human persons, situating his preferred hylomorphic view between the excesses and defects of dualism and materialism, as well as addressing some of the bioethical issues most associated with disagreements over the nature of human persons: abortion and permanent vegetative state (PVS). The text takes up the philosophical question of whether there is a shared nature common to all human beings, and Eberl defends a Thomistic account of human nature in response. Eight chapters comprise the book: The first formulates the question and lays out the nine desiderata that inform the structure of the text; the second argues for Eberl’s account of a hylomorphic view of human nature, after surveying [End Page 404] other potential interpretations; the third addresses dualism; and the fourth materialism. The second half of the book takes up bioethical issues associated with human persons: The fifth and sixth chapters consider the beginning of human persons and their death, respectively; chapter 7 engages questions of the afterlife; and chapter 8 focuses on the moral status of persons. In arguing for a “middle way” between substance dualism and reductive materialism, the text is structured to satisfy nine desiderata of accounts of human persons, including: 1. that it is possible for human beings to survive bodily death 2. that they are biological organisms 3. that the physical aspect of human nature is not defined in terms of the existence and persistence of material constituents alone but includes the proper organization and functioning of those constituents in a unified organism 4. that certain types of conscious thought processes are explanatorily irreducible to neural functioning 5. that human beings are “persons” and thus add a significant ontological category of self-conscious, free, and moral beings to the universe 6. that a human being exists as a unified entity, as both a person and an animal 7. that there is no postulation of the existence of ontological entities beyond what may be necessary to account for the facts of human nature 8. that there is a strict criterion of identity for human beings that is both metaphysically determinate and empirically verifiable 9. that the account of human persons coheres with the transplant intuition. If the first half of the text is metaphysics, the second half, especially the final chapter, is bioethics; however, Eberl weaves themes throughout the text so clearly that it reads as a single, complete whole. The entire text will benefit philosophers and theologians, including graduate students, who engage questions of personhood. It ought to be taken up by academic bioethicists, as well, both for its clear argumentation and helpful assessment of bioethical issues in chapter 8, but also as a model for rooting bioethical analysis in strong foundations. It may be accessible to advanced undergraduates in philosophy, theology, and potentially bioethics. The text affords students and teachers the additional benefit of an exemplar in clear thinking and careful argumentation—up to and through—the analysis of two challenging bioethical issues. A review is not complete without a critique, and this text has limitations of two kinds: readership and scope. Though argued well and articulated clearly, this is not a text for bioethicists without some background, training, or interest in philosophical argument. It is unlikely to be read by clinical bioethicists, practicing healthcare workers, or students of nursing, [End Page 405] medicine, health sciences, or health policy. Thus, though the arguments have potential for a positive impact on healthcare policy, additional...