Abstract

Human actions are a central subject of social sciences. Philosophical research into the nature of actions, no doubt, cannot but have consequences for our understanding of social sciences themselves. This article begins by considering the problem of the individuation of a human action: what is an action and what is the difference between the action and bodily movement (or behavior)? I briefly outline and examine Brodbeck and Weber's philosophical responses to this question. I then attempt to integrate our understanding of action with Donald Davidson's view on the causal explanation of human action. The aim of my research is to reveal the nature of human action at the end.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.