The Narrow Notion of Realism in Human Geography

Abstract

The paper provides an analysis of the reception of realism in human geography. Gaps are identified between geographers' realism and realism as conceived by philosophers of science. The paper first outlines philosophers' abstract or thin 'CoreRealism' in simple ontological, semantic, and episte- mological terms. It then shows how human geographers' 'GeoRealism' has concretised and thickened this core notion by incorporating a specific metaphysics of causation, a specific metaphysics of society, and a specific methodological doctrine about how to conduct (empirical) research. Addition- ally, GeoRealism has neglected central concerns of contemporary philosophy of science: the ontology of existence, the semantics of truth, and the epistemology of warranted belief. This has resulted in a notion of realism that is narrow in terms of its domain of application and its philosophical resources. The domain narrowness of GeoRealism may lead to inaccurate attitudes and antipluralist policies towards theories and approaches that are compatible with the broader CoreRealism. The resource narrowness of GeoRealism threatens to weaken its capacities to reflect critically on social construc- tivist and other allegedly antirealist trends as well as on the radical fallibility of human geographic theories and explanations. The paper offers an account of GeoRealism as an outgrowth of historically contingent circumstances and suggests that human geographers would benefit from reconsidering their understanding of realism within the broader perspective of philosophical literature.