The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War

Abstract

There is an almost undisputed consensus in the present era that the decision of President Lyndon Johnson to commit hundreds of thousands of American combat troops to fight in South Vietnam was a mistake of gigantic proportions. This large escalation of the American role in Vietnam in 1965 was an early and crucial chapter in a subsequent decade of failure and tragedy in Southeast Asia. In search of how such a misguided venture as the American participation in the Vietnam war could have happened, historians and political scientists have written much about the personality of Johnson and the advisory process surrounding the President. These two elements are often regarded as possible causes of the American miscalculation in entering the war on a massive scale. This article will suggest that a mythology has been prevalent for some years regarding Lyndon Johnson, his willingness to listen to varied advice on handling the Vietnam situation in 1965, and the scope of the advice he in fact received before deciding on escalation. The most important myth is that Johnson was a "victim of groupthink," that is, that he did not receive wide ranging opinions from significant advisers about whether or not to intensify America's military role in Vietnam. This myth suggests that with one principle exception no important advisers urged