The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. By Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xiv, 327 pp. Cloth, $75.00, ISBN 978-0-521-83365-3. Paper, $21.99, ISBN 978-0-521-71231-6.)

Abstract

Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II present an intriguing and utterly compelling argument in their book, The Myth of the Eastern Front. The authors argue that, contrary to the stereotypical Nazi villains of popular post-World War II war film, a very different kind of image of the German soldier emerged on the eastern front. Fueled by the onset of the Cold War and starting in the 1950s, American military officers, politicians, and finally the public “were uncommonly receptive to a view of World War II as it was fought in Russia that was remarkably similar to that of many Germans, especially leading circles of the former German military and even National Socialists” (p. 2). The key thread in this emerging counternarrative was the view of a “clean” Wehrmacht (German regular army), which was disconnected from the war crimes committed against Russia. The first three chapters trace this remarkable revision of history and memory. Chapter 1 recounts the uneasy World War II alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the authors emphasize the temporary enthusiasm for the Russian ally at this time. More importantly, there was no doubt in anyone's mind at the end of the war about the atrocities that the German military, with the concerted help of the Wehrmacht, had committed on the eastern front. Nevertheless, the immediate onset of the Cold War facilitated a rapid resurgence of latent pro-German as well as anti-Russian sentiments. Provided with this opening, German military officers began to rehabilitate the image of the Wehrmacht. Led by Franz Halder, who was chief of the army general staff from 1938 to 1942, these former officers eventually produced 2,500 manuscripts that would shape the emerging military consensus and affirm a view of the guiltless German regular army. By 1951, even Dwight D. Eisenhower embraced this nascent consensus when he stated: “I have come to know that there is a real difference between the regular German soldier and officer and Hitler and his criminal group” (p. 75).