The Myth of the Chinese Exclusion Case: The Fuller Court and the Origins of the Plenary Power Doctrine

Abstract

For many commentators, Chae Chan Ping v. United States - commonly known as the Chinese Exclusion Case – occupies a prominent place in the rogues gallery of infamous Supreme Court decisions. In large measure, the reaction to the decision is simply a byproduct of the outcome of the case; in both Chae Chan Ping and its first cousin, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court upheld measures that explicitly singled out Chinese immigrants for unfavorable treatment on the basis of their national origin. But Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting are also reviled because they are generally seen as the source of the hated doctrine - the view that, for constitutional purposes, congressional decisions on immigration and naturalization issues are qualitatively different from other federal legislation, and thus should generally not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Scholars also contend that the creation of the plenary power doctrine was itself a byproduct of the justices’ racist distaste for Chinese immigrants and a felt desire to allow Congress the greatest possible latitude for restricting immigration from China.This article challenges the latter two contentions. First, the article argues that the Court did not base its decisions in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting on the plenary power doctrine, but instead simply purported to be applying principles that were applied more generally to constitutional analysis in the late nineteenth century. Second, the article contends that the overall pattern of the Court’s decisions in the late nineteenth century belies any claim that anti-Chinese bias blinded the justices to the demands of normal principles of legal analysis. Finally, the article ascribes the origins of the plenary power doctrine to United States ex. rel. Turner v. Williams - a case decided more than a decade after Chae Chan Ping that was unrelated to the dispute over the rights of Chinese immigrants.