Abstract
The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims about synonymy and substitution while respecting the compositionality principle. Thus, Salmon (Philos Rev 115(4):415, 2006) and Glanzberg and King (Philosophers’ Imprint 20(2):1–29, 2020) offer occurrence-based accounts of variable binding, and Pagin and Westerståhl (Linguist Philos 33(5):381–415, 2010c) argue that an occurrence-based semantics delivers a compositional account of quotation. Our thesis is this: the occurrence-based strategies resolve the apparent failures of substitutivity in the same general way as the standard expression-based semantics do. So it is a myth that a Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics affords a genuine alternative strategy.
Highlights
For comments and discussion, thanks to Michael Glanzberg, Nathan Klinedinst, Peter Pagin, and two anonymous referees for Linguistics and Philosophy
Proponents of compositional semantics are faced with a standard diet of options in response to these apparent violations of the principle of compositionality
According to Kripke, Frege’s theory should not be assimilated to ordinary ambiguity—instead it should be understood as something more systematic and rulegoverned. Those who are inclined to emphasize this difference between ordinary ambiguities and Fregean “reference shift” must develop a semantics which can systematically predict the shifty behaviour of an expression across various linguistic contexts
Summary
We described three pairs (1), (2), and (3) which differ merely by the substitution of the co-referential terms ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’. Frege explained substitution failures of these types by arguing that the particular uses (in the relevant sentences) of ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’, have different referents. The customary referents of ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’ are the same city As they occur embedded under quotation marks, propositional attitude ascriptions, and modal operators, respectively, Frege thinks that these expressions have distinct referents. Proponents of occurrence-based semantics believe this Fregean idea can be implemented so as to expand our standard diet of options concerning apparent failures of compositionality. The method of indirect discourse uses the same expression, but offers more complicated semantic rules which allow the expression to make different truth conditional contributions in its different occurrences, to explain the substitution failures (Kaplan 1964: 27–28). Doing so reveals that neither approach expands the standard diet of options
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