The Myth of Direct Democracy

Abstract

This chapter examines the alternative to representative democracy sometimes defended by its democratic critics: direct (or unmediated) democracy. For all its appeal, direct democracy, whether face-to-face or enabled by new technologies, is not a viable solution to the problems of representative democracy because it is either feasible but normatively undesirable or, if it is defined in normatively desirable terms, entirely unfeasible. The chapter pushes back against three common beliefs: the Rousseauvian (originally Hobbesian) idea that sovereignty is essentially about having the final say; the historical claim that representation was rendered necessary by the size of mass societies; and the view of Classical Athens as the archetype of a direct democracy. It argues that direct democracy is a false alternative, one that is credible only if one accepts the mistaken Rousseauvian view of sovereignty as limited to having the final say — and a non-deliberative one at that. In the end, direct democracy is parasitic on non-democratic forms of agenda-setting and deliberation, or else must turn representative — i.e., involve a delegation of authority — to some degree. Even Classical Athens was not the paragon of “direct” democracy as it is often portrayed and functioned along broadly representative or proto-representative (though non-electoral) lines.