The multifaceted constitutional dynamics of U.K. devolution

Abstract

When it was introduced in 1999, devolution for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland was recognized as a constitutional change of pivotal importance. This article argues that devolution has been a dynamic process which has triggered further important constitutional changes. The first section provides a conceptual discussion of devolution by comparing it with federalism as a system of territorial government. In order to further develop the argument, attention is then concentrated on the evolving characteristics of the respective systems in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Particular attention is devoted to crucial issues of constitutional design. For example, this includes the failure to establish a link between revenue raising and spending in Scotland; the creation of a Welsh Assembly without sufficient law-making powers; the debate over the functions granted to the Northern Ireland executive. Next the discussion turns to the so called West Lothian question which draws attention to the most pronounced asymmetry caused by devolution, namely, the implications of not having an equivalent level of devolved government for England. Finally, the discussion examines the impact of devolution on legislative procedures and the use of legislative consent motions. The article concludes by considering the trajectory of the changes to each devolved system and related constitutional implications.