Abstract

The discussion about the moral status of novel beings tends to focus on artificial intelligence, robots, and other man-made systems. We should, however, also consider a likelier kind of novel beings: animals that are genetically modified to develop human-like cognitive capabilities. This paper focuses on the possibility of conferring human characteristics on nonhuman primates (NHPs) in the context of neuroscientific research. It first discusses the use of NHPs for neuroscientific research and then, second, describes recent developments that promise to revolutionize the field and how that may lead to NHPs attaining human-like cognitive capabilities. Third, an account of moral status is developed to ground the central claim, that making the NHP brain more human-like is unproblematic as long as the NHPs do not become persons. In conclusion, this paper discusses the implications for the moral status of cognitively enhanced NHPs, as well as the implications for other novel beings.

Highlights

  • The academic literature on the possibility of encountering novel beings, that is, nonhuman intelligence or nonhuman consciousness, tends to focus on artificial intelligence (AI), robots, or other mechanical, man-made systems, with the occasional consideration of aliens

  • One way of improving animal models of the brain is to make the Nonhuman primates (NHPs) brain more like that of humans. This raises a number of ethical issues, but here I will be primarily concerned with the implications for the moral status of “cognitively enhanced” NHPs and what it might mean for other novel beings

  • Since NHPs are important for neuroscientific research, both for normal functions and for brain disorders, genome editing may be used to improve NHPs as animal models in neuroscience

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Summary

Introduction

The academic literature on the possibility of encountering novel beings, that is, nonhuman intelligence or nonhuman consciousness, tends to focus on artificial intelligence (AI), robots, or other mechanical, man-made systems, with the occasional consideration of aliens. I develop an account of moral status to ground my central claim, that making the NHP brain more like the human brain is unproblematic as long as the primates do not become persons.

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