The Moral Perils of a Superstrong Black Mother

Abstract

AbstractInvestigations into clinical communication and interaction have provided an avenue for a Foucauldian‐style analysis of how subject positions are produced in clinical settings through various practices of moral subjugation, often drawing upon such concepts as biopower and biosociality. I take an alternative approach. In exploring the moral vulnerabilities of coming to inhabit a particular subject position, I build upon a first person neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics rather than a Foucauldian‐inspired one. My central claim is that although a focus on biopower is enormously fruitful, moral vulnerability is about more than being morally subjugated. This does not sum up the moral perils that people may face, especially the possibility of moral tragedy. In the context of an ethnographic case centering upon one mother, Dotty, and her very ill daughter, Betsy, I argue for why a conception of tragedy is so important to moral life and why a first person virtue ethics is invaluable for its exploration. This case centers upon Dotty's interactions and relationships with the doctors caring for her daughter. It is drawn from a 15‐year ethnographic study of African American families in Los Angeles who have children with significant illnesses and disabilities.