Abstract
In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.
Highlights
Many share an intuition that self-consciousness is highly morally significant
Self-consciousness can and often does function as a shiny red herring. (Why this is so is not something I have speculated on here.) I have considered two ways to defend the claim that the possession of self-consciousness generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing: one indirect, the other direct
I argued that the best-known arguments along the indirect route depend in various ways on unwarranted assumptions about self-consciousness’s functional significance and that once these assumptions are undermined motivation for these arguments dissipates
Summary
Many share an intuition that self-consciousness is highly morally significant. There are various ways of explicating this significance. Self-consciousness is what (morally) sets humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Self-consciousness is a necessary condition on possession of moral personhood, ‘full moral status’, or a right to life. I will focus on the following explication. The fact that an entity E is self-conscious generates strong (i.e., not outweighed or overridden) moral reasons against harming or killing E.
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