The Moral Failure of the Quest for Certainty

Abstract

This chapter explores the relevance of ontological assumptions for justifications of agency and ethics. It critiques Kantian ethics’ reliance on the substantialist ontological imaginary of Newtonian physics. Through critiquing the substantialist, anthropocentric, and colonial implications of that ontology, the chapter argues that Kantian criteria are not only insufficient to make good choices but also conducive making to wrong ones. For instance, they elicit self-appeasement in international interventions. The chapter proposes that an ontology of entanglements opens possibilities to overcome the shortcomings of an ethos based upon abstractions and possibly for correcting its moral failures. A quantum ontological imaginary validates ethical choices through contextual evaluation and an interrogation of the apparatuses selected. Specific practices, rather than an abstract humanity, are the referents for devising such ethos.