The moral elevation of animals: The case of ?gorillas in the mist?

Abstract

All cultures provide their members with ways to understand differ? ences between animals and humans and with ideas of appropriate "human" or "animal" behavior. Conceptions of animals in pre-modern societies are part of an integral conceptual system where there is considerable agree? ment about world view and ethos. For example, the Balinese characterize animals as hairy beings who walk on four legs and have sharp teeth. Hu? mans must separate themselves from any animal-like behavior. They must be hairless, walk on two legs and have flat teeth. To keep a clear separation between human and animal, the Balinese do not allow babies to crawl, file their teeth flat at puberty and view hairy people (e.g. Europeans) as ani? mal-like demons. In modern technological societies, however, these conceptual systems lose their integrity and become a complexly interwoven proliferation of cul? tural beliefs about humans and animals (cf. Berger 1979, Levy 1972). For example, in modern America, there are a variety of belief systems which people can use to address human/animal distinctiveness. Human/animal re? lationships assume variegated forms ranging from animals as "family" mem? bers ("children in fur coats"), animals as property, or for human consumption to idealized beings in need of protection. Under the condition of modernity, the semantics of everyday life (those systems of meanings people use to interpret their participation in society) become highly multifaceted and multi-vocal (Frank 1987). Con? trasted with traditional culture, where the range of answers to fundamental questions is less diverse, in contemporary society there is no single system to impart consistent meaning to the daily actions of everyone (Swidler, 1986). With regard to distinctions between animals and humans, we might expect mutifaceted and multi-vocal expressions as indicators of ideological competition for meaning. For example, Kellert (1978, 1988) surveyed a