Abstract
The streams of research on adverse selection and escalation of commitment are still inconclusive and limited by only manipulating adverse selection in 2 conditions, namely the presence and absence of adverse selection. Meanwhile, the literature shows that adverse selection will always exist in agency contracts even though the information asymmetry mechanism has been modified. This study considers adverse selection manipulation into two levels: high and low. This research investigates the moderating effect of supervision on the impact of adverse selection and commitment escalation. This research used an experimental method with a 2 x 2 factorial design between subjects. This study involved undergraduate accounting students as extension practitioners. The test results show that different levels of adverse selection impact levels of commitment escalation. The research also indicates that supervision is quite effective in filtering the impact of adverse selection on commitment escalation behavior
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
