The Mobilization and Recruitment of Foreign Fighters: The Case of Islamic State, 2012–2014

Abstract

IntroductionThe study of foreign terrorist fighters has become crucial to understanding the evolving nature of in the twenty-first century. For many countries, terrorism and its perpetrators have become a top security threat. Despite the declaration and launch of the global war on terror, some terrorist entities have been able not only to survive but also to develop and increase their numbers, particularly their number of recruits, known today as foreign fighters. Since 2013, Al Qaeda's offshoot known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le- vant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS) or Islamic State (IS) has been rapidly gaining a foothold in territories and countries in the Middle East where state control is weakened, predominantly in Iraq and Syria.The analysis of foreign terrorist fighters' recruitment/mobilization has become important given the rapid development of IS. A key feature of IS is the way in which it recruits foreign fighters globally and the way in which individuals join this organization on their own. It is difficult to give an exact number of the people joining IS, but there is an on-going flow of individuals from different countries who are willing to fight for IS.1 As they have taken part in terrorist operations and become exposed to radical interpretations of Sunni or Wahhabi Islam, these people pose a potential security risk to their home countries if and when they should return.In order to understand why IS has been successful in attracting and recruiting foreign fighters, one should study both the mechanisms of recruitment/ mobilization and the independent radicalization process. Specifically, this paper focuses on institutional and individual levels of mobilization of foreign fighters from 2012 to 2014. The former refers to an institution/agency, in this case IS, as the key actor in luring in individuals,2 whereas the latter is based on personal/group radicalization.3 This will be assessed through the examination of merely sixteen individual case studies, due to the limited availability of foreign fighters' profiles. Based on the large scale of mobilization of foreign fighters, their numbers and the countries they come from, the case studies have been randomly selected from the following countries that head up the list of foreign fighters statistics on a regional basis (in terms of absolute numbers): Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK).4 Firstly, I will consider IS's background, its structure, strategy and tactics. This will be followed by an explanation of the concept and role of foreign fighters. Additionally, the relationship between the country profiles and foreign fighters will be examined. Finally, this will be followed by an analysis of the mobilization and recruitment processes and by sections offering a conclusion and policy recommendations.The Rise of Islamic StateAs a terrorist entity, IS was formed in 1999 and was known as Jama'at al Tawhid wal Jihad under the command of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. It was primarily active in Jordan and Afghanistan. Later, in 2004, it pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Qaeda funded its training camps, and the Taliban provided it with territory in the western province of Herat in Afghanistan.5 The same year, this entity renamed itself Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn (Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]) and participated in the Iraqi insurgency. AQI recruited Iraqis and was very active in cooperating with nationalist and Ba'athist insurgents in Iraq.6 Being [l]ess disciplined, more violent and often terroristicaMy more efficient, al Zarqawi attracted new groups to his unit under Al Qaeda's wing.7 His successful operations helped him to strengthen his position and reputation in the terrorist world.8 Following his death in 2006, the organization merged with other entities, renaming itself several times before separating from Al Qaeda and becoming Islamic State (IS) in 2014 under a new leader, Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. …