The mixed nature of Belgian cabinets between majority rule and consociationalism

Abstract

Abstract. Since World War II, Belgian cabinets have presented distinctive characteristics that are worth analysis. Based on the definition of five dimensions used to classify the cabinets of the parliamentary systems of Western Europe ‐ stability, party composition, internal decision‐making, power latitude and recruitment, this article is an attempt to place Belgian cabinets in this framework. Belgian cabinets are not very stable with a small top elite, often rotating ministerial posts. They are formed most often by partial coalitions. They have a rather consensual though hierarchical decision‐making technique. They are rather autonomous vis‐a‐vis the Parliament, but less so vis‐à‐vis political parties and pressure groups, though they are widening their freedom to manoeuvre. Their recruitment is essentially parliamentarian. In order to reach a theoretical interpretation of this descriptive analysis, the validity of applying the principles of ‘consociational democracy’ to Belgian cabinets is also assessed. The findings suggest a pattern of 'semi‐consocia‐tionalism’ with the Belgian cabinet displaying a mixture of techniques both from majoritarian democracy and consociationalism.