Abstract

To military analysts; the year 2000 does not look very far off. Major weapons systems and platforms (for example, ships) are typically in service for 20–25 years, sometimes for 30. The process of pre-feasibility study, feasibility study, project definition and development now takes of the order of 10 years, so the newest systems in service in 2000 are already on the drawing board; while systems coming into service now will still be around not only in 2000, but in 2010, 2015 or even 2020. This gives the military analyst a singular perspective on the problem. A second idiosyncrasy is that military planners spend much of their time concerned, not with events that are actually happening, or are likely to happen in the near future, but with something further in the future which they hope will never happen: major war. Happily, with the current improvement in East-West relations, this is looking even less likely than it did some years ago. This paper does not, therefore, concentrate on maritime strategy, but is based on the premise that World War III will not happen. However, military uses of the North Sea in peace-time are inextricably bound up with likely uses in war even though, as will be demonstrated, there is a paradox in that the busiest area in major war is the least suitable for exercises. In spite of the encouraging events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, arms reduction and the reduction of East-West confrontation, the possibility of East-West conflict is likely to remain the only possible scenario for major conflict in western Europe and the surrounding portion of the Northern Hemisphere. It is unlikely that any other event would cause major armed conflict in the North Sea/North Atlantic/Norwegian Sea area. This possibility will, therefore, continue to drive peacetime preparations, deployments and exercises. Furthermore, regardless of where future conflict may break out, nations, like people, tend to practise at home, and the North Sea is very much the back-yard for Britain, Norway, Denmark and West Germany (although many of the latter's preparations and exercises have a Baltic orientation). This paper begins with the strategic position of the North Sea, and then addresses peace-time military uses, some of which derive from planning and preparation for war, and some of which are related to lower levels of conflict, for example terrorism, and some of which are quite independent. Another point that must be borne in mind is that military operations are fluid and flexible, even more so when naval and air forces are involved, and that whilst this paper focuses on the North Sea itself, an understanding of the surrounding area and the broader strategic context are necessary, as forces can be moved very rapidly.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call