The Military History of the Soviet Union

Abstract

Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, eds. Ine Military History of the Soviet Union. New York: Palgrave, 2010. vii, 336 pp. Maps. Index. $30.00, paper.The present work is the second collaboration between Robin Higham and Frederick Kagan who have previously edited The Military History of Tsarist Russia. Put together the two books carefully blend new archival research and secondary sources, and readily augment other recent works by David Stone, David Glantz, Roger Reese, Bruce Menning, and others. This volume features seventeen chapters, more or less in chronological order, by thirteen distinguished scholars of history, political science, and strategic studies. Despite the scope and range of topics covered, the narrative is held together by several important themes that run through the essays. As the editors point out, there are a number of defining forces that have shaped the Soviet military. In many cases geography conspired against the Russian army and navy. This was coupled with the often antagonistic relationship between the military and the Communist party, and the perennial struggle of the latter to impose itself on the former. Finally, there is the connection between the inherent economic inconsistencies of the Soviet regime and the inability of its armed forces to pursue longterm, technological, and expensive innovations. Other important themes include reform and reaction within the military establishment, and breaks and continuities between the Imperial, Soviet, and post- 1991 militaries.The volume is divided into two parts. The first part examines the Soviet military up to 1945. In the introductory chapter the editors review some of the themes of the previous volume and introduce a sampling of the major issues in the military history of the Soviet Union. In the next three chapters David Stone and Robert Ponichtera deftly cover the painful birth of the Red Army and its doctrine through the Civil War and the Russo-Polish War. Stone's discussion concerning the role of ideology and pragmatism in shaping early Soviet military doctrine is of special interest. In chapter 5, Stone covers the industrialization of the Red Army, explains why the army did not stand up to Stalin and collectivization, and suggests four reasons for the failures of the Red Army between 1 928 and 1941. The next chapter is about the development of Soviet operational art and is arguably among the best in the volume. Through lucid and interesting analysis, Kagan rightly concludes that [i]n the interwar years Soviet theory far outstripped Soviet practice and Soviet capabilities (p. 9 1 ). Chapter 7 examines the battles and engagements in Spanish Civil War, skirmishes with the Japanese in the Far-East, the quick Polish campaign, and the disastrous war with Finland. Chapters 8 and 9 are masterful narrations of the Great Patriotic War by John Erickson and Frederick Kagan. Erickson documents the Soviet calamities up to 1 942 and Kagan analyzes the recovery of the operational art by the Red Army from 1 943 onwards. Next, Mark O'Neill provides a well written examination of the Soviet Air Force and Christopher Lovett contributes a synopsis of the Soviet Navy up to 1945, though he bypasses any discussion of early Soviet naval thought. …