The Middle East Arms Package: A Survey of the Congressional Debates

Abstract

The fight over the proposed package of US jet fighters to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia pitted against each other the Carter Administration and the pro-Israel lobby. Its immediate result was the defeat of the pro-Israel lobby, though its long-range effects are difficult to distinguish. Although one thinks of the powers available to the President of the US, his office and the Federal Government as unparallelled by any other legal force in the US, the parties to this legal battle were not unequal, in terms of the power available to them, and the pro-Israeli forces in the American Congress were a very fair match for the Carter Administration. If there was a tilt towards either side, it was in the latter's favour. The President of the US cannot, by his word alone, provide other countries with weapons worth more than $20 million. Such deals must be approved by a majority on Capitol Hill, where the Congress resides. In this political battle, the President brought to his aid such officials as Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defence Brown, General David C. Jones of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jerome H. Stolorow of the General Accounting Office, Paul C. Warnke of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Henry Kissinger and many others. The main theme they adopted was that all three countries should receive the jet fighters