THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: CANDIDATE STRATEGIES AND ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Abstract

The empirical findings in the previous chapter present a challenge to the current understanding of when competitive elections yield successful democratic consolidation and when they do not. The evidence shows that it is not just national institutions, economics, or attitudes that condition a successful endgame to democratic transitions. Political leaders' participation in electoral competition, and the subsequent molding of opportunities for voter participation, also matter for larger political outcomes. The second finding is that while political parties are often the most important vehicles for prompting elites to work together and invest in strategies that further democratic development, the types of parties that ensure this behavior are not the inevitable outcome of electoral competition, particularly in the early going. In these cases, it is necessary both to look beyond political parties to consider the effects of independent candidates and to scrutinize the internal operation of parties in order to understand the types of parties that contribute to democratic development. Both of these findings point to the need to study the conditions that lead individual politicians, and in particular candidates and party leaders, to invest in electoral strategies that support the nascent democratic regime. The three components of electoral infrastructure – information, coordination, and cooperation – provide a road map to define democracy-supporting strategies. For example, some political leaders forego electoral competition altogether and seek power through appointment or indirect pressure. Some candidates join political parties, while others do not.