Abstract

Electronic hardware trust is an emerging concern for all stakeholders in the semiconductor industry. Trust issues in electronic hardware span all stages of its life cycle - from creation of intellectual property (IP) blocks to manufacturing, test and deployment of hardware components and all abstraction levels - from chips to printed circuit boards (PCBs) to systems. The trust issues originate from a horizontal business model that promotes reliance of third-party untrusted facilities, tools, and IPs in the hardware life cycle. Today, designers are tasked with verifying the integrity of third-party IPs before incorporating them into system-on-chip (SoC) designs. Existing trust metric frameworks have limited applicability since they are not comprehensive. They capture only a subset of vulnerabilities such as potential vulnerabilities introduced through design mistakes and CAD tools, or quantify features in a design that target a particular Trojan model. Therefore, current practice uses ad-hoc security analysis of IP cores. In this paper, we propose a vector-based comprehensive coverage metric that quantifies the overall trust of an IP considering both vulnerabilities and direct malicious modifications. We use a variable weighted sum of a design's functional coverage, structural coverage, and asset coverage to assess an IP's integrity. Designers can also effectively use our trust metric to compare the relative trustworthiness of functionally equivalent third-party IPs. To demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the proposed metric, we utilize our trust metric on Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted variants of an IP. Our results demonstrate that we are able to successfully distinguish between trusted and untrusted IPs.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call