Abstract

McCloskey is against what he considers to be the traditional approach to the philosophy and methodology of economics. He is specifically opposed to the philosophies (of knowledge) of Hume and, even more so, of Popper. He seems, generally, to be against philosophy or, at least, philosophy of knowledge and methodology as such and, in comparison to them, offers ‘rhetoric’ for more favourable consideration. We argue that the epistemologies of Hume and of Popper should, indeed, be rejected but that they should be rejected on philosophical and methodological grounds rather than on ‘rhetorical’ ones. While some particular methodological theories can and should, as McCloskey suggests, be abandoned, economic methodology as such stands undamaged by McCloskey’s attempted attack upon it.

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