THE METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC MODELLING AND THE LIMITS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE RESEARCH OF THE MIND

Abstract

This article can be considered as an attempt to investigate the complex problem of the epistemic essence and typologization of models in science, as well as an attempt to determine the scope and boundaries of the modeling method in the research of the human psyche. The solutions to these issues led the author of the article to believe that the methodological analysis of the development of models in various sciences is far from complete and will continue in the coming years. The author connects the prospects of such an analysis with the logical clarification of a number of concepts and approaches related to the nature of models in science and the modeling method in general. A separate part of the article is devoted to the genesis of the idea of modeling the functions of consciousness. In particular, in this context, the article analyzes behaviorism, the models of which do not meet the requirements of the principle of completeness. A special place is also given to the idea of computer modeling of consciousness and its justification in the form of functionalism in psychology. The spread of functionalism in the article is associated with the use of the concept of machine modeling of rational functions proposed by A. Turing and his followers. At the same time, the author of the article dwells on the critical analysis of functionalism from the standpoint of emergent naturalism of J. Searle. In this context, it is shown that the creation of effective computer programs in itself is not a sufficient basis for the absolutization of the functionalism approach. The main argument of this article is aimed at substantiating the fact that any attempt to create a strong AI cannot be successful, since the internal causal relationship between the human brain and its psyche remains unclear. Thus, the application of functionalism should be accompanied by an understanding of its scope and boundaries.