The Method of Language-Games as a Method of Logic

Abstract

Abstract This chapter develops an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s method of language-games as a method of logic that exhibits continuities with Frege’s, Russell’s, and the early Wittgenstein’s conceptions of logic and logical analysis as the method of philosophy. On the proposed interpretation, the method of language-games is a method for isolating and modelling aspects of the uses of linguistic expressions embedded in human activities that enables one to clarify complex uses of expressions by gradually building up the complexity of clarificatory models. Wittgenstein’s introduction of the language-game method constitutes an attempt to overcome certain limitations of calculus-based logical methods, and to extend the reach of logical methods, so as to make accessible areas of language use and thought that are not accessible by means of calculus-based methods. Rather than rejected, calculus-based methods are retained as a special case of logical methodology. The method of language-games is thus compatible with the employment of calculus-based methods in logic and philosophy, and the method of language-games involves no exclusive claim to being the correct method.