Abstract
Chapter 7 examines a principle Aristotle formulates in Nicomachean Ethics I.3: ethics must be adequate for its domain. The ethicist must ask herself what her inquiry is about, study the nature of her theory’s subject matter, and observe norms of theorizing that are adequate for it. The subject matter of ethics is value as it figures in human life. Aristotle ascribes two features to this value: difference and variability. Other theorists, he notes, are misled by difference and variability and become relativists. They observe a lack of strict regularity and falsely conclude that the domain of value is messy, unsuitable for any general insights. In Aristotle’s view, the sphere of agency displays for the most part regularities. The chapter defends this proposal as an important metaphysical insight and discusses how it adds to the much-debated claim that situations in which agents act are particulars.
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