Abstract
Propositions have been long thought by many philosophers to play a number of important roles. These include being the information conveyed by an utterance of a sentence, being the primary bearers of truth and falsity, being the possessors of modal properties like being possible and necessary, and being the things we assume, believe, and doubt. This article canvases significant attempts by philosophers to say what sorts of things propositions are. First, the classical views of propositions advanced by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell are considered. Second, the view of propositions as sets of possible worlds is discussed. Next, views of propositions arising out of work on direct reference are discussed. The article closes with a discussion of more recent views of propositions.
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